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Abstract 
Several recent studies show that immigrants exhibit higher levels of trust in public 
institutions than natives. This study uses pooled data from the European Social Survey to 
examine possible reasons for this ‘over-confidence’ of immigrants, arguing that it is largely 
the relatively lower expectations of immigrants from countries with poorer institutional 
performance that account for this difference. The eminent role of expectations is also 
underscored by the finding that low social standing matters less for the level of trust of 
immigrants than it does for natives. The ‘frame of reference effect’ weakens over time and 
with increased acculturation in the country of residence, suggesting that expectations are less 
strongly based on experiences in the country of origin the better integrated an immigrant is in 
the country of residence. A small part of  immigrants’ higher trust levels overall and some of 
the dual frames of reference effect are also explained  by the more conservative value 
orientations of immigrants from countries with lower political stability, who appear to regard 
stability and conformity more highly, which in turn is associated with higher levels of 
institutional trust. 
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Introduction 
An increasing number of studies indicate that immigrants exhibit higher trust in political and public 
institutions than natives. Weaver (2003) and Wenzel (2006) find that Mexican Americans exhibit 
higher levels of trust in political and societal institutions than the general population while Maxwell 
(2008) shows members of British ethnic minority groups trust political institutions more than whites. 
Bilodeau and Nevitte’s (2003) analysis of political trust of migrants in Canada revealed that migrants 
are more trusting than native residents. Röder and Mühlau (2010) show that trust levels of first 
generation immigrants in European countries in public institutions are higher than the trust levels of 
the native populations and the same holds for satisfaction with government (Maxwell, 2010).  This 
may seem counterintuitive considering the relatively less favourable position of immigrants in many 
societies. Therefore we ask in this paper: what can explain the high level of trust of immigrants in 
European countries? 
Previous studies indicate that ‘over-confidence’ in political institutions erodes over time and 
across generations: Canadian migrants from non-democratic states loose trust the longer they stay in 
Canada (Bilodeau and Nevitte, 2003). Michelson (2001, 2003) and Wenzel (2006) show that 
Mexican-Americans are more sceptical of American institutions the more acculturated they are to 
mainstream society.  Foreign born Mexican-Americans are more trusting than Mexican-Americans 
born in the US (Wenzel, 2006; see also Michelson, 2001) and second generation immigrants in 
Europe show lower levels of trust than natives and first-generation migrants  (Röder and Mühlau, 
2010). We aim to replicate this finding for European countries to determine whether low assimilation 
into the host society is linked to higher trust levels (acculturation hypothesis). 
Yet this does not explain the initially high levels of trust amongst immigrants, and more 
recent research has suggested that different evaluative frameworks may be of importance. Firstly, 
immigrants may compare the host country’s institutions with those in their country of origin, and 
should therefore have lower expectations than natives (Maxwell, 2010). We test whether the origin 
country context has the predicted influence (reference point hypothesis), and develop this argument 
further to determine in how far this influence fades over time, and whether the generally observable 
negative impact of low social status is mitigated by these different evaluations (status indifference 
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hypothesis). We furthermore test the possibility that expectations of immigrants may not only be 
lower, but also be different from those of natives, as immigrants may have different value orientations 
that could explain their higher trust (value-mediation hypothesis). Immigrants often come from 
countries with different values than those prevalent in European countries (Inglehart, 1997), and 
values in turn are linked to trust (Devos et al., 1992), making this a viable alternative explanation. 
These hypotheses are tested using a double comparative design that permits to separate 
‘community effects’ from residence country and origin country effects. (Van Tubergen et al., 2004). 
‘Community effects’ are effects at the level of migrant groups from a specific source country in a 
specific host country. These are crucial for this study as a core argument is that the comparison 
between the institutions in the residence and the origin country guides the evaluation of residence 
country institutions. Using data from the European Social Survey allows us to analyse the attitudes of 
migrants living in a variety of European states who originate from countries with very varied 
institutional settings. No other dataset that is currently available has included this range of countries 
or the necessary country of origin information for this type of study. 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
Acculturation. In line with ‘classical’ assimilation theory (Gans, 1973; Alba and Nee, 1997) it may be 
assumed that expectations and values become more similar to the expectations and values of natives 
over time. The home frame of reference will become less salient over time as the memories of the past 
fade, contacts with the home country become more sparse and social contacts with members of the 
host countries more prevalent. Similarly, immigrants are more likely to adopt the values prevalent in 
the host country, the longer they stay. These processes are likely to work more quickly for immigrants 
who are eager to integrate into the host society. Children of immigrants born in the country of 
residence have little or no contact with the home country of their parents and are likely to take their 
lead from peers rather than their parents. This leads us to formulate the following acculturation 
hypothesis: Better acculturated immigrants (in terms of length of stay, generation, language usage and 
citizenship) will have less trust than less well acculturated immigrants.  
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Expectations: Dual frames of reference. Research indicates that trust in institutions may depend more 
on the expectations of the citizens than on ‘objective’ indicators of economic and political 
performance. For example, rising expectations rather than declining performance are invoked as cause 
for the decline in political trust that most democratic countries experience (Miller and Listhaug, 1990; 
Orren, 1997). Expectations of immigrants, however, are likely to be shaped not only by the realities in 
their host country but also by past experiences in their home country. Frequently, immigrants appear 
to evaluate their situation, for example educational opportunities (Suarez-Orozcco, 1987) or working 
conditions (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003; Binford, 2009; Heath and Li, 2008), more positively than 
natives would in the same context.  A ‘dual frame of reference’ (Suarez-Orozco, 1987) that anchors 
the evaluation of the present situation in the immigrants’ past experiences in their home country has 
been suggested as the underlying mechanism. Most immigrants leave their countries of origin because 
they expect better opportunities in the destination countries. As long as the circumstances in the host 
countries compare favourably to the situation in their home country, the ‘dual frame of reference’ will 
induce a more positive evaluation relative to people who lack this anchoring.  There are indicators that 
‘dual frames of reference’ govern not only the evaluation of individuals’ success and the opportunities 
of immigrants. For example, immigrants judge moral behaviour (Reese, 2001) or treatment by 
authorities (Menjivar and Bejarano, 2004) relative to the standards of their home countries. It is likely 
that past experiences also shape the appraisal of societal and political institutions inducing a more 
favourable view of host country institutions for migrants who migrated from countries with poor state 
institutions.  
Röder and Mühlau (2010) showed that the quality of host country institutions, measured by 
Worldbank quality of governance indicators (Kaufman et al., 2009), is an evenly strong predictor of 
the trust in public institutions of natives and of immigrants in European countries. According to the 
dual frame of reference theory, immigrants compare the institutional reality of the host country with 
their experiences with institutions in the home country as a reference point. This leads to the reference 
point hypothesis that immigrants’ trust in institutions of the host country is expected to be larger the 
poorer the quality of home country institutions is relative to the host country institutions. This 
reference point hypothesis provides the most direct test for the ‘dual frame of reference’ theory. 
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Support for the reference point hypothesis is further strengthened if the difference between the quality 
of home and host country institutions bears a stronger relationship for recent immigrants than for 
established ones and for first generation than for second generation immigrants reflecting a decreasing 
salience of the home country frame of reference. 
In general, it is observed that citizens with a low standing in society exhibit lower trust in 
institutions than high status citizens, be it that low status citizens attribute their social position to the 
political system, that the institutions have a class-bias or that – as Putnam (2000: 138) observed -- that 
‘…haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect (…)  than ‘non-haves’’.  However, 
immigrants’ comparison of their status with people in their home countries is expected to mitigate the 
corrosive effect of low status positions in the country of residence. The status indifference hypothesis 
posits that the relationship between social position variables (education, income) and trust in 
institutions is less negative for first-generation migrants than for native born.  
 
Value congruence. An alternative explanation for the phenomenon that immigrants trust more in 
public institutions than natives is that immigrants, predominately socialised in ‘more traditional’ 
societies and frequently facing strong material constraints in their destination countries, have value 
orientations that lead them to appreciate more the institutional reality of their destination countries 
than the native population. According to this view, immigrants do not have lower expectations, they 
have different expectations. Inglehart (1999) argued that the declining trust in societal institutions can 
be explained by a ‘shift from materialist values, emphasizing economic and physical security, to 
postmaterialist values, emphasizing individual self-expression and quality of life concerns’ (Inglehart, 
1997: 28). Although the erosive effect of postmaterialist values is assumed to pertain primarily to 
hierarchical institutions, postmaterialism is shown to be associated with lower political trust 
(Catterberg and Moreno, 2006): ‘Although postmaterialism is fundamentally pro-democratic, it also 
reflects elite-challenging views and behaviour, as well as increased dissatisfaction with the established 
authority in today’s democracies’ (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006: 42). Similarly, Devos et al. (1992) 
claim that trust in institutions is affected by human values: ‘Individuals who give high priority to 
conservation values are more likely to trust institutions, whereas individuals who cherish openness to 
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change values adopt a more sceptical orientation toward institutions’ (Devos et al., 1992: 484). The 
underlying rationale is that institutions produce stability and hence are more congruent with 
conservation values and incongruent with ‘openness to change’ orientations. A positive correlation 
between religiosity and trust in institutions has been interpreted in a similar way: Religiosity is 
understood as a proxy for conservative attitudes (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006) or a proxy for an 
affinity to conservation values and a distance to openness to change values (Devos et al., 1992). 
Based on this, we formulate a value mediation hypothesis that holds that the higher trust 
levels of immigrants, but also possible acculturation and reference point effects are mediated by 
different value orientations of immigrants. Assuming that most immigrants in Europe have moved 
from countries with a higher prevalence of conservation values, less emphasis on change and stronger 
religious orientations, differences between immigrants and natives regarding their trust in institutions 
may be explained by differences in their value orientations. Similarly, it is expected that value 
differences underpin the relationship between indicators of acculturation and trust in institutions. 
Moreover, as countries with poor political institutions may be characterised by high prevalence of 
conservation values and low emphasis of ‘openness to change’ values, the reference-point effects on 
trust may prove spurious: It may not be the comparison of host with home country institutions, but the 
societal context nurturing conservation values and discouraging openness to change values that 
accounts for the relationship described as reference-point hypothesis. A strong affiliation with religion 
may be one vehicle to stabilise these value orientations.  
 
Data 
 
The data are extracted from the first three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), and was 
collected between 2002 and 2006. In the dataset for this analysis we include natives, defined as 
individuals whose parents and who themselves were born in a country, first generation migrants, 
defined as respondents whose parents and who themselves were born abroad, and second generation 
migrants, who were born in their country of residence, but whose parents were both born abroad and 
both in the same country. As the first round of the ESS does not include detailed information for 
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parents’ country of origin, we exclude second generation migrants from this round. We also exclude 
any cases that do not belong into any of the three categories, such as return migrants or individuals 
with only one foreign born parent. These criteria were used to construct the three categories as clearly 
as possible and exclude any ambiguous cases such as return migrants. 
Individuals are seen as nested within their country of residence and their ‘community’. For 
first generation migrants and natives, the ‘community’ is defined by their country of origin and their 
country of residence. For second generation migrants, parents’ origin country and country of 
residence are used to define the community the respondent belongs to. First and second generation 
migrants are in separate communities even if the origin is identical. If country of origin information 
was missing, the respondent was excluded.  
We use data from 26 out of 29 countries covered by the first three rounds of the ESS. These 
include the EU 15 countries and the EFTA states Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Further, eight 
new member states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia) are included. We excluded Turkey, Ukraine and Israel from the analysis. As there may be a 
different relationship between quality of governance and trust in these countries, both a dummy for 
new member states and an interaction with quality of governance is included. Also all analyses were 
performed on a subset of EU15/EFTA and EU15 to test robustness. Findings do not change in 
substance when these subsets are used alternatively. 
 
 Trust in public institutions is measured in the ESS with a range of variables that assess, on a 
zero to ten scale, how much people trust different public institutions of the survey country. Four of 
these variables are present in all three rounds of the ESS: how much people trust their country’s 
parliament, the legal system, the police and politicians. The reliability of this four item scale was 
confirmed with Cronbach’s Alpha for individual survey countries between 0.655 and 0.785, and a 
sum score was calculated from the four items, with higher scores indicating more trust. Cases with 
missing values were excluded. 
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Acculturation.  Length of stay was coded in five categories, immigrants who arrived within 
the last year, 1 to 5 years, 6-10 years, 11-20 years and more than twenty years ago. Product terms for 
interaction effects with this variables have been formed with a binary coding (1=10 or less years, 
0=more than 10 years). The variable ‘different language’ indicates that a migrant mainly speaks a 
language at home which is not an official language of the country of residence. Self-reported 
citizenship in the country of residence is also used as proxy for acculturation. All these variables are 
only included for first generation migrants. 
 
Social status. The social status of the respondent is measured by their education, their 
household income and their main source of the household income. Education was measured in years 
of education for the highest completed credential. Income is measured by the relative income position 
of the household in the country of residence. Income source was coded into three categories 
depending on the main source of income declared: the first includes income from employment, self-
employment and pensions (reference category), the second income from welfare and unemployment 
benefit (‘benefits’) and the third covers income from savings and others sources (‘other income’). 
 
The difference between the quality of host and home country institutions are measured by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (‘Quality of Governance’) published by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009). This is a composite indicator incorporating six dimensions: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption, all based on a large number of sources. One of the 
advantages of this index is that as it covers all host countries and almost all origin countries in our 
dataset. Figures from 2002 to 2005 inclusively are used to compute averages for the six dimensions. A 
factor score of these indicators is computed based on the values of host and origin countries included 
in the dataset. This factor explains 89.69% of the variance of the six dimensions. These factor scores 
are also used to derive a measure for the difference between the quality of the origin and the host 
country institutions. This measure is computed by subtracting the host country score from the origin 
country score. For second generation migrants, the country of origin refers to the parents’ country of 
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origin. Scores for respondents indicating that they were born in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were 
computed as averages of the countries that these countries were divided into. 
 
Values:  Values are measured by selected human values (Schwartz, 1992). In the Schwartz 
value theory, ‘openness to change’ vs ‘conservation’ is one of two  fundamental dimensions of human 
values. Openness to change values are measured as average score on 6 items associated with ‘self-
direction’, ‘stimulation’ and ‘hedonism’, conservation values as average score of 6 items associated 
with ‘security’, ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’ represent the ‘conservation’ dimension (see Davidov et 
al., 2008).  As further measures of value orientation are included: self-reported religiousness (0-10 
scale), being member of a non-Christian religion and the product term between both.  
 
Table 1: Independent variables: Means and Percentages by Migrant 
Status 
 
 Total Native Generation 1 Generation 2 
Gender (% female) 52.1 52.1 52.3 49.5* 
Age 47.02 47.19 45.88** 40.67** 
Education in years 11.92 11.90 12.20** 12.07 
Income 6.13 6.12 6.39** 5.69** 
Income source (% from welfare/unemp.) 4.5 4.3 7.1** 6.2** 
Income source (% from other sources) 1.8 1.8 2.4** 1.9 
Citizenship (% holding citizenship) n/a n/a 47.4 n..a. 
Official language spoken (%) n.a. n..a. 59.1 n.a. 
Length of stay (% <1 year) n/a n/a 1.2 n/a 
Length of stay (% 1-5 years) n/a n/a 13.5 n/a 
Length of stay (% 6-10 years) n/a n/a 13.5 n/a 
Length of stay (% 10-20 years) n/a n/a 23.2 n/a 
Conservation Values  -2.67 -2.68 -2.58** -2.63* 
Openness to Change Values  -2.98 -2.98 -2.94** -2.84** 
Religiosity 4.85 4.81 5.38** 5.08# 
Religious denomination (% non-Christian) 1.5 0.5 14.5** 12.1** 
Difference Quality of Governance  n/a n/a -2.12 -1.89 
Country of residence (% New member state) 22.5 22.8 14.4** 31.2** 
Quality of Governance 0.18 0.17 0.39** 0.10** 
Number of cases 105,878 98,268 6,137 1,473 
Significance levels #= <.10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01 
Percentages (%) reported for categorical variables 
 
 
Missing values for independent variables were substituted, in hierarchical order, by the means 
of the community group (migrant status X country of origin X country of residence), the country of 
origin means (migrant status X country of origin) and the country of residence mean (migrant status X 
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country of residence). All quantitative variables are centred around the sample mean with the 
exception of the quality of governance indicator. Household income is centred around the country 
mean. Dummies for cases with missing values on a variable are included in the regression, but not 
reported in the tables.  
 
Modelling 
The data have been modelled as hierarchical linear models (multi-level models) using 
MLwiN 2.15. Three levels have been specified: Individuals at the lowest (n=105,878 of which 6,137 
are first generation migrants and 1,473 second generation migrants) and countries of residence as the 
highest level (n=26). Units at the second level are ‘communities’. Communities are defined as 
(Country of residence X country of birth X immigrant status)-cells. In total, there are 1,282 level 2 
units. 26 units comprise natives, 995 units comprise first generation immigrant communities from 172 
countries of origin and 261 units comprise second generation immigrant communities from 96 
countries of origin. Random intercepts have been specified for the higher levels and random slopes for 
variables that are interacted with higher level predictor variables. Only the variances of intercepts and 
slopes are estimated but not co-variances. Complex variance modelling at the individual level has 
been applied to take into account for group-specific variation than immigrants. In the tables, we report 
only the main variance component at the respective level. All models have been estimated using full 
maximum likelihood estimation as implemented as IGLS in MLwiN.  
 
Results 
 
Models 1 to 5 (Table 2) present the findings that allow us to test the above hypotheses. All models 
include natives, first and second generation immigrants, although some variables, such as length of 
stay, are only estimated for the subgroup of first generation immigrants. Model 1 reports the 
differences between natives and immigrants taking into account the nested structure of the data, i.e. 
the grouping of individuals in ‘communities’ and countries of residence. All models also control for 
age, gender, quality of institutions, education, household income and source of income and whether 
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the host country is a new member state. Differences in the models between natives and immigrants are  
therefore not the result of differences in group composition, but reflect actual difference if these 
factors are held constant. 
Model 1 shows that first generation immigrants exhibit significantly more trust in institutions 
than natives (b=.80). In line with the acculturation hypothesis, second generation immigrants have 
significantly less trust (b=-.88) than natives (and first-generation migrants). Further findings to assess 
the support for the acculturation hypothesis are contained in Models 3 and 4.  Support for the 
acculturation hypothesis is provided by the finding that immigrants speaking a different language at 
home than the official language of the host country put significantly more trust in public institutions 
than migrants who speak the official language at home, and that immigrants who acquired citizenship 
of the country of residence are less confident than immigrants who are not citizens of the host country 
(Model 3).  Model 4 also includes length of stay for first generation immigrants in order to examine 
whether migrants exhibit less trust in public institutions the longer they have lived in the country of 
residence. The reference category are immigrants staying longer than 20 years.  In evaluating the 
results, it should be taken into account that the model also contains an interaction effect between 
staying less than 10 years and the difference between the quality of home and host country 
institutions. Without these interaction effects, the coefficients for the three more recently arriving 
groups would be about .55 larger. The coefficients indicate that trust decreases continually with length 
of stay. Once length of stay is included, the effect of citizenship disappears underscoring that the 
negative relationship between citizenships and trust levels reflects that citizenship for immigrants is a 
proxy for acculturation.  
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Table 2: Multi-level regressions of Trust in Public Institutions 
 Model  1 Model 2 Model  3 Model 4 Model  5 
FIXED PART Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Intercept 20.18** 0.62 
   
20.14** 0.60 20.09** 0.59 19.68** 1.24 19.88** 1.22 
Migrant status 
Immigrant (1
st
 
generation) 0.80** 0.29 -0.09 0.32   0.97 0.64  0.89 1.25 0.75 1.24 
Second generation   -0.88*  0.36  -0.84# 0.44    -0.82# 0.45  -0.86# 0.46  -0.89# 0.46 
Background 
Gender (1=female)   -0.11* 0.05   -0.11*  0.05    -0.10# 0.05  -0.11* 0.05 -0.47** 0.05 
Age/10 
Social status 0.15** 0.01 0.16** 0.01 0.16** 0.01 0.17** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
Education 0.08** 0.02 0.08** 0.02 0.13** 0.02 0.13** 0.02 0.15** 0.02 
Education X 1st 
Generation       -0.08* 0.04   -0.10* 0.04 -0.10** 0.03 
Income 0.21** 0.02 0.21** 0.02 0.22** 0.03 0.22** 0.03 0.24** 0.02 
Income X 1st 
Generation      -0.01 0.06   0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Benefits -1.15** 0.28 -1.23** 0.21 -1.51** 0.24 -1.50** 0.24 -1.41** 0.23 
Other income -0.77** 0.13 -0.77** 0.13 -0.77** 0.13 -0.76** 0.13 -0.74** 0.13 
Benefits X 1st 
Generation 
Acculturation        0.97* 0.48    0.84# 0.48  0.75 0.47 
Diff. Language X 1st 
Generation     0.73** 0.23    0.58* 0.23    0.50* 0.23 
Citizenship X  1st 
Generation       -0.47* 0.22   0.07 0.23  0.14 0.23 
Length of stay: < 1 
year       3.00** 0.96 2.80** 0.96 
Length of stay: 1-5 
years       1.39** 0.46 1.21** 0.46 
Length of stay: 6-10 
years          0.96* 0.45   0.85# 0.45 
Length of stay:11-20 
years 
Values       0.88** 0.27 0.70** 0.27 
Open to change 
Values         -0.24** 0.03 
Conservation Values         0.30** 0.03 
Non Christian           0.99* 0.51 
Religiosity         0.34** 0.01 
NonChristian X 
Religiosity 
Country-level         -0.28** 0.07 
New Member State   0.69       1.63  0.85 1.62   1.01 1.58   1.18 1.55 1.30 1.43 
Quality of 
Governance 2.40** 0.78 2.37** 0.77 2.41** 0.76 2.47** 0.74 2.72** 0.68 
NewMember State X 
Qual Governance    3.48# 1.92    3.50# 1.89    3.52# 1.85    3.54# 1.81    3.40* 1.68 
Frame of reference 
Difference Qual Gov 
X 1st Generation   
    -
0.43** 0.07 -0.38** 0.07   -0.22* 0.09   -0.15# 0.09 
Difference Qual Gov 
X 2nd Generation   -0.02 0.17 -0.03 0.17 -0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 
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Difference Qual Gov 
XLength < 10 yrs   
    
  -0.21 0.14 -0.19 0.14 
RANDOM PART Σ SE σ SE σ SE σ SE σ SE 
Country level           
Intercept  3.39 1.07 3.39 1.06 3.24 1.03 3.16 0.99 2.60 0.83 
Immigrant (1st 
generation) 0.21 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.74 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.46 0.40 
Second generation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.30 0.61 0.43 0.63 0.51 0.65 
Community level           
Intercept 1.29 0.31 0.93 0.27 0.77 0.26 0.68 0.25 0.74 0.25 
Education  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Income 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Benefits 1.11 0.46 1.01 0.43 0.89 0.40 0.89 0.40 0.75 0.35 
Length < 10 yrs       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Individual level           
Intercept  51.33 0.24 51.33 0.24 51.33 0.24 51.32 0.24 50.34 0.23 
Intercept/Immigrant 
(1
st
 generation) 2.59 0.54 2.55 0.54 2.53 0.54 2.37 0.53 2.86 0.53 
Intercept/Second 
generation 4.04 1.13 4.10 1.13 4.17 1.13 4.18 1.13 4.47 1.12 
           
Δ-2*loglikelihood, df  2057.0 22 2091.0 24 2118.3 29 2175.5 36 3985.0 44 
All regressions further controlled for missing values (variable-specific dummies); NoCases: n1=105,878, 
n2=1,282, n3=26 
Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed 
 
The reference point hypothesis led us to expect that the trust level of immigrants is higher the poorer 
the quality of governance in the country of origin relative to the country of residence. The estimate for 
the difference between quality of host and home country is significantly negative for first generation 
immigrants (Models 2 and 3). Moreover, when comparing Models 1 and 2, it is clear that the contrast 
between host and home country institutions (average value: -2.1) fully accounts for the change in the 
coefficients for first generation immigrants (Model 1: b= .80; Model 2: b= -.09), i.e. the home country 
frame of reference explains the higher average trust of first generation migrants. Model 2 also shows 
that the contrast between host and home country institutions is unrelated to the trust levels of second 
generation immigrants and that this relationship is significantly stronger for first when compared with 
second  generation migrants. Finally, the relationship is stronger for first generation immigrants who 
migrated to the host country in the last 10 years (b=.-43) than for first generation immigrants who 
have lived more than 10 years in their country of residence (b=-.22). However, this difference is not 
statistically significant (see Model 4). 
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To evaluate whether social status is less important for immigrants’ trust than for natives’, Model 3 
should be consulted. It contains the estimates of social status variables interacted with being a first 
generation immigrant. For first generation migrants, education is not significantly related to trust in 
institutions (b=.13-.08=.05, t=1.31) and this relationship is significantly weaker for immigrants than 
for natives. Similarly, immigrants who depend on benefits as income source are not significantly less 
confident than other immigrants (b=-1.51+.97=-.54; t=1.14) and the link between being a benefit 
recipient and trust is weaker for immigrants than for the native born population. Both findings are in 
line with the status indifference hypothesis. However, in contrast to this hypothesis, income has the 
same effect for first generation migrants and the native born population.  
 
The idea of value congruence suggests that immigrants are more oriented toward conservation values 
and assign less priority to openness to change values. To test whether this holds, we firstly examine 
whether immigrants differ in these values from natives, which is reported in Table 3. As expected, on 
average first generation immigrants exhibit stronger preferences for conservation values and are more 
religious (and more likely to be affiliated with a non-Christian religion) than the native born 
population. Second generation migrants are more similar to natives than first generation migrants 
although the differences between first and second generation migrants are not significant. However, 
the average immigrant does not differ from the typical native with respect to their endorsement of 
openness to change values (Panel 1). As Panel 2 of Table 3 indicates, intra-generational value 
acculturation appears to play a role: While the average immigrant who resides more than 20 years in 
the host country is in general undistinguishable from natives, more recent migrants have a consistently 
stronger conservation orientation, are less in favour of openness to change values and are more 
religious. Large value differences are associated with the migrants’ country of origin. The coefficients 
for the difference between home and host institutions are substantial, highly significant and indicate 
that migrants from countries with comparatively poor institutions are more conservation oriented, 
more religious and, albeit to a lesser degree, less open to change. 
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Table 3: Multi-level regressions of Schwartz-Values and Religiosity  
Dependent variable Conservation  
Values 
Openess-to- 
change Values 
Religiosity Non-Christian  
Religion 
PANEL 1 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Immigrant (1
st
 gen)  0.15** 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.71** 0.24 3.31** 0.30 
Second generation 0.09# 0.06   0.05 0.04  0.41# 0.26 3.08** 0.32 
PANEL 2 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Immigrant (1st gen)  0.08 0.10   0.09 0.11 -0.08 0.41 1.82** 0.58 
Length of stay: < 1 year  0.10 0.08  -0.05 0.08 0.74** 0.28  0.05 0.34 
Length of stay: 1-5 yrs  0.14** 0.03 -0.13** 0.03 0.69** 0.11  0.08 0.14 
Length of stay: 6-10 yrs 0.09** 0.03 -0.14** 0.03 0.49** 0.11  0.16 0.13 
Length/ stay:11-20 yrs 0.08** 0.02 -0.09** 0.03 0.50** 0.09  0.04 0.12 
Second generation -0.01 0.05   0.04 0.05 -0.19 0.25  1.41 0.42 
DiffQuaGov X 1
st
 gen -0.10** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 -0.36** 0.03 -0.66** 0.05 
DiffQuaGov X 2ndgen  -0.07** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.36** 0.07 -0.73** 0.10 
Controlled for gender, age, education, income, income source 
Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed 
 
Turning to the relationship between values and trust in institutions (Model 2, Table 2): As expected, 
openness to change values are negatively related to trust, whereas conservation values and religiosity 
are positively related to trust in institution. More religious people exhibit more trust in institutions, but 
this relationship is much weaker for people affiliated with non-Christian religions. The ‘reference 
point effects’ and ‘acculturation effects’ appear to be partially mediated by values, in particular by a 
higher orientation toward conservation values, but also by a higher degree of religiosity. However, 
value mediation explains only a fraction of these ‘effects’:  about 30 percent of the effects of the 
contrast of home and host country institutions and, for example, less than 10 percent of the difference 
between recent (less than 1 year) and established immigrants (more than 20 years in host country). 
Moreover, value assimilation appears to be a slow process which extends over generations and shows 
substantial effects only for immigrants who are in the host countries for more then 20 years. In 
contrast, the ‘normalisation’ of trust happens quicker, is largely completed after 20 years of stay and 
does not extend to the second generation – as is plausible for a change of expectations as opposed to 
values. Taken together, the data are consistent with the value mediation hypothesis. The value 
orientations of migrants from less well governed countries contribute to their strong trust in the 
institutions of the country of residence. Value orientations can, however, not account for the overall 
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pattern of relationships that has been found to be supportive for the acculturation and the reference 
point hypotheses. 
 
Conclusion 
In line with previous studies (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003; Maxwell, 2008; 2010; Röder and Mühlau, 
2010; Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), first generation immigrants are found to have higher levels of 
trust in institutions compared to natives, whereas this is not the case for the second generation, who 
are in fact significantly less confident than both the first generation and native born citizens. This 
over-confidence decreases the more acculturated immigrants are to mainstream society, whether this 
is measured with longer residence in the host country, generational status (see also Michelson, 2001; 
2003; Röder and Mühlau, 2010; Wenzel, 2006), or language and citizenship. This finding confirms 
for the European context what has been noted previously for the United States. 
 The main aim of this paper was to account for the higher trust levels of immigrants, with two 
main explanations being tested. Firstly we asked, does this ‘excess-confidence’ of migrants stem from 
their lower expectations of institutional performance due to their experiences in their origin countries? 
Indeed the frame of reference explanation finds very strong support in the data. The overall higher 
trust level of the first generation could be fully explained by the difference in quality of governance 
between host and origin country. The better the institutional performance in the host country 
compared to the origin country, the higher the trust in these institutions. This is further supported by 
the decrease in this effect the longer migrants stay, the general decrease in trust levels over time, and 
the negative effect of acculturation. Furthermore, social position matters less for the first generation, 
so that the frame of reference effect seems to soften the impact of socio-economic disadvantage. 
Migrants give credit to public institutions in their host countries, but this credit fades away the more 
migrants are exposed to the working of these institutions and as the memories of the country of origin 
become more distant. 
Secondly we asked, do the high levels of trust of migrants indicate that they hold values that 
may be conducive to develop trust in public institutions? As expected, migrants, particularly recent 
arrivals, from countries with less political stability and lower quality of governance have more 
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traditional and security oriented values and are less open to change, as well as reporting higher levels 
of religiosity. This is in line with McAllister and Makkai’s (1992) findings that immigrants from non-
democratic countries are more supportive of strong government, and may have more authoritarian 
values. Whilst most of these values are associated with trust in the expected direction, they do not 
explain the differences in trust in institutions between natives and immigrants, and only account for a 
relatively small part of the effect of difference between quality of governance in host and origin 
country. They also mediate only a small proportion of the acculturation effect in terms of length of 
stay and the timing of value change is different from the change of trust. Fears about the problematic 
nature of migrants’ values as expressed by some commentators (e.g., Huntington 2004) therefore 
seem unfounded – this study finds that value differences are of relatively minor importance for 
migrants’ higher trust levels. Additionally, values adjust over time – albeit slower than expectations, 
and the values of second generation in particular are largely similar to those of natives.  
In this study we evaluated trust in the four public institutions that were included in all of the 
first three rounds of the European Social Survey (parliament, the legal system, the police and 
politicians). This is a limitation because other institutions such as social, housing, educational and 
health services may be more important for the daily experiences of migrants and their well-being. 
Equally, when evaluating trust in individual institutions, somewhat different patterns may occur that 
are specific to how the performance of particular institutions is perceived. This was not the interest 
here, as we focused on general trust in public institutions, but may be an interesting subject for further 
research.  
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